

SUMMARY OF PROFESSIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

1. First name and last name: Andrzej DRZEWIECKI

born on 6 December 1955 in Lipno

2. Held diplomas, degrees / artistic degrees - with the name, place and year of their award, and the title of dissertation

- 2002 - University of Gdańsk, Faculty of Philology and History, Institute of History - PhD in humanities in history. Doctoral dissertation: *Adam, Alexander and Boris Mohutchev in the service of the Polish Navy* Doctoral dissertation advisor - Professor Jerzy Przybylski). A scientific degree awarded by the resolution of the Scientific Council of the Institute of History of the University of Gdansk of 22 February 2002;
- 1997 - Gdansk University of Technology - Faculty of Management and Economics - post-graduate studies in education;
- 1985 - Military Political Academy in Warsaw - Faculty of Political Science - MA in Political Science. Master's thesis: *French Left vis-à-vis the events in Poland (August 1980 - December 1981)*, Master's thesis advisor - Kazimierz Łastawski, Doctorus Habilitatus;
- 1978 - Stefan Czarniecki Military Academy Officer's College. - diploma of higher vocational studies in social sciences;

3. Information on the history of employment in scientific / artistic units

- 1978 - 2007 - service in Navy units, in accordance with the service assignment;
- 2005 - 2007 - Assistant Professor - Head of the Department of History and Political Science, Institute of Social Sciences, Polish Naval Academy;
- 2008 - 2010 - Assistant Professor - Head of the Institute of History, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Polish Naval Academy;
- 2010 - 2012 - Assistant Professor at the Institute of History;
- 2012 - 2016 - Assistant Professor - Deputy Dean for Science Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences;
- from 1 November 2014 - 30 September 2016 - Assistant Professor - Deputy Head of the Chair of Maritime Studies;

4. Specification of the achievement under Article 16(2) of the Act of 14 March 2003 on Academic Degrees and Academic Title and Degrees and Titles in the Field of Arts (Journal of Laws No. 65, item 595, as amended):

As a scientific achievement I submit a monograph: **Polish Navy from the Second to the Third Republic of Poland. Study of State Maritime Security.** Publishers - "Napoleon V", Gdynia - Oświęcim [Auschwitz] 2016, pp. 1047, (Issue 3).

My field of interests and research includes the study of the history of the Polish Navy, set against the recent history of Poland and dynamically changing international environment. Throughout all my research, I have assumed that the Polish Navy has not been a spontaneous organisational and task force, but only one of the important links in socio-political and economic processes affecting the extent and effect of Poland reaching out to the sea and benefitting from this privilege. "Reach out to the sea," not against someone, but to make the most of the opportunities it provides, is the essence of the maritime policy of the state. Bearing this in mind, it has been precisely the issue of maritime policy that I have made the key of the case, with a view to demonstrating that the maritime policy has been decisive for the presence of the state at the sea, and the "marine tools" at its disposal. Little doubt, the war fleet, strongly associated with the state's maritime safety is one of them. This dependence is self-evident and for this reason I believe that quantitative and qualitative condition of the war fleet is the responsibility of the state which determines the role of the fleet (for the times of peace and war) while defining its maritime policy. The pragmatics of the tasks determine the size of the fleet, its organisational structure and the diversity of forces and resources at its disposal.

Over the past decades, the navy has been personalised, and a misconception has arisen among the citizens that it is the charisma of individual commanders that determined the navy fleet that we maintained. It should be emphasised that some admirals would venture out to this role, more often than not with different results, not necessarily for the best for the navy. It has been a convenient cover for the state authorities, which by personalizing the war fleet, have felt absolved from responsibility for the condition of the "maritime Poland". In the afterthought of those considerations, the question has arisen as to whether anyone needs the Navy at all. In 2017, this question is posed as often as it was in the interwar years. This constitutes a clear signal that Poland faces a serious problem related to its presence at sea and is not able to resolve it in a reasonable and resolute manner.

Recapitulating these few comments, I wish to reiterate it that in my research, the war fleet is the resultant of the needs and capabilities of the state derived from its maritime policy, to which it dedicates all its intellectual and organisational potential. Given that the Republic of Poland has failed to conduct thus understood policy and no signs occur today heralding any breakthrough in this area in the near future, the prospect of the "incapacity to perform its

tasks" by the Polish Navy is becoming a reality. "The poor state cannot afford a war fleet", wrote Professor Gerard Labuda and the reality has declared him right. Though we acquired it via our considerable social and economic endeavour, "fleet issues" has made us dependent on stronger partners not only in terms of know-how, but also politically and militarily. This was the price that Poland paid for its internal weakness, which was also manifest in its maritime ventures. "Given the age and the expiry of the lifetime of the ships, I quote the head of the Department of Technical Modernisation Planning of the Navy in the Navy Development Planning Board (XII 2016), most of them will leave the line soon. Maintained with tremendous human effort, with undoubtedly "divine element", efficiency of systems, cannons and rocket launchers, engines and generator units somehow continues to facilitate performing missions at sea." I have researched and examined real maritime policy and real war fleet, and I believe that futile discussions in this area pose a considerable risk to the maritime safety of the state, especially in the context of the ongoing and planned supply of energy resources by sea. It's just a piece of maritime reality, where the war fleet executes serious tasks within the overall project - the maritime safety of the state.

In the first paragraph, I clearly stated that I examined and assessed "fleet operations" against the background of the recent history of Poland and dynamic international developments. This approach reflects the accepted research methodology, in which, I believe, the war fleet is not the aim, but the means to guarantee the maritime safety of the state. As the internal and international situation in the period under review featured considerable volatility, all fleet issues should be viewed against those mechanisms. I believe that this approach is definitely lacking in the Polish marine subjects, and that is why the war fleet grows in it to an event bordering heroism. Monographs, doctoral dissertations, and contributing works on individual squadrons or types of maritime weaponry are important, nonetheless they fail to provide an overview of the entire Polish fleet, especially in terms of examination and synthesis. I hope the monograph I submitted completes this gap.

The threats to state security did not come out of nowhere, but it was the international situation that generated them. Being the domain of the state, maritime policy was supposed to respond to them. This was not a question of unreasonable expanding the tonnage of the war fleet, but a rational approach to maritime affairs, which looked rather bad in the geopolitical configuration of the interwar period. Against this backdrop, it was reasonable to omit Pomerania in effective operational planning with all consequences of this step. Political and social actions that rendered the defenceless coast the vanguard of the Polish maritime *raison d'état* should be deemed unreasonable.

In my research I can distinguish several characteristic "thematic" areas that fit into the basic research profile:

- the first - includes research on the Navy of the Second Republic of Poland, which was presented in monographs: *Adam, Alexander and Boris Mohutchev in the service of the Polish Navy* and in articles: *Polish Navy in the interwar period. Success or failure? The "Polish Corridor", as a specific frontier and its influence on defence issues in the interwar period*. The scientific conference and publication under my edition: *The cadre of the Polish Navy in 1918 – 1989* was dedicated to understanding the times and environment of establishing marine forces;
- The second one has been related to the maritime policy of the state, which is reflected in the following publications: *At the origin of maritime policy of the Poland Reborn. Between dreams and realities; Social and propaganda aspect of maritime policy of the state (1918 - 1939); Dominium maris Baltici. Voice in discussion about the Polish presence at sea; At the origin of Polish "complexes and myths of the sea; The charm of the sea and its discovery in the interwar period* and in the extensive study entitled *The Meanders of Polish Baltic Policy*;
- Third - includes strictly political issues but closely related to the issues of military development and security. My own views on these issues were highlighted in the following articles: *On the role of Pomerania in the policy of the Second Republic of Poland under the influence of Professor Roman Wapiński; Political and military situation in the Baltic Sea after 1945 and its influence on naval military thought; "Cold War" and its influence on the development of Polish military thought between 1946 and 1970; "Cold War" - conflict of many aspects; Concepts of Coast defence and development of Polish naval forces after 1945; Navy of the Polish People's Republic as a factor of stabilisation and cooperation in the Baltic region after 1945; Polish foreign policy after 1989 and its impact on the state's position in international relations and its security; Historian on contemporary security dilemmas; Poland and its historical experience vis-à-vis the challenges of uniting Europe; Wars of 1945-2005 and their impact on politics and diplomacy of the period; Events in Poland between 1980 and 1981 in the opinion of the left-wing French press; "Orange" Ukraine from the Polish political perspective; Ukraine and Poland in the context of their historical experience. Is Stepan Bandera really the essence of the problem?* In this group I include collective publications, which I edited, which was the fruit of a scientific conference: *Armed conflict in the Baltic sea in the concept of Cold War*

ideology after 1945; Polish Navy in the implementation of the state's political and military alliances between 1918 and 2004; This canon also includes a nationwide scientific conference I organised: From the sea and Pomerania, a look at September 1939 and a two-volume publication: From the sea and Pomerania a look at September 1939. Politics and war and From the sea and Pomerania, September 1939. Memory and responsibility;

- Fourth - it is a special one, because it concerns the Navy of the Polish People's Republic which due to its political-ideological involvement is a subject-matter of the intense polemics and provokes the assessments inspired by the contemporary historical policy. My view on these matters was presented in the following articles: *Navy of the Polish People's Republic 1945-1989. Service in the fog of ideology; Navy after 1945. National or in the Polish language version; War experience and its impact on the development of Navy in Poland after 1945; Manipulating the history of the "people's" Navy is also a barbarity; Officer of the "people's" Navy. Between education and ideologisation; Managers and organisers of Naval personnel training in the years 1945-1970; About Soviet specialists in the Polish naval fleet after 1945 - evaluation attempt; Naval officer's family home (1945-1989) - space not necessarily private; Apolitical character of the army - some reflections in historical perspective and in the Sejm National Defense Commission (6th-9th term of office) about the social role of the "People's" Polish Army;*

Of course, my research is based largely on domestic and foreign archives, nonetheless I wish to emphasise here that a considerable cognitive value was awarded to the authorised interviews, which I conducted with a group of commanders and admirals occupying supervisory positions in the Navy following 1989. In this way, I developed unique material that no archives hold. Furthermore, conducting interviews with a number of admirals on the same or similar topics, allowed me to confront statements and assessments. I consider it my success that I have managed to convince officers of such a high rank to talk about the Navy, along with a sense of responsibility for the way the information is implemented. According to this method I developed two monographs: *Professorship with the sea in the background, or about officers engaged in lecturing at the Polish Naval Academy*, and *Counter Admiral Hieronim Henryk Pietraszkiewicz. This was the war that made me a soldier*. It was, as a matter of fact, a never ending conversation and discussion about various issues, beginning from personal to organisational and task-based concerning the Polish Navy.

The above-mentioned stages and publications clearly demonstrate that I have gradually expanded my research and matured to formulate more and more serious assessments and findings. A real breakthrough occurred during the work on the *Meanders of Polish Baltic Policy*, when I understood that the thread of the Polish maritime tradition was very fragile and there was shortage of experience underpinning the construction of the "maritime Poland". It was also for this reason that I made the question "why?" a key issue in my research. I made an attempt to learn and understand the circumstances which contributed to so many difficulties that this important political and social "project" project came across.

I consider fleet issues and maritime safety from three complementary perspectives: historical, political, and social. The first one allowed me to examine experience that did not always come up to the needs and expectations. By drawing findings from them, we do not need to torture the modern generation of seafarers with tales of unwanted fleets and military conspiracy against it. The weakness of the fleet, both the pre-war, post-war and contemporary, has deeper roots, and they originate from the weakness of the state, which rather "feigns" the presence at sea than it is in reality. I do not share the opinion that security, including marine, political and social emergence emerged only after 1989. The scarcity or disregard of historical experience in this area make us suddenly "discover" issues that occurred or were described years ago. It would be better if the history remains *magistra vitae*, and we can take a wise recourse to it, without getting angry at it.

The politological perspective has provided me with the opportunity to examine and assess the mechanics of changes in the international environment, especially in terms of the threats that I am interested in and the resulting defence needs. The Navy fleet, which fits into maritime policy of the state, should be able to react to them both in the national and allied system. Ensuring maritime safety is, first of all, responsibility of the state, and must be integrated into its maritime policy, whereas alliances are only ancillary support. I get the impression that in Polish conditions, this order is reversed. And finally, an equally important social perspective, because the war fleet would not exist were it not for the human factor. From my examination it clearly occurs that it was the latter that primarily determined its condition and quality. We tend to emphasise that the war fleet is "continuity and tradition". If so, then little doubt, those are the pillars of the fleet based on the human factor. I believe this is a wider problem and in fact it was the determination of the public that was crucial for Poland reaching out to sea. This way, at least partially, Naval Captain Mieczysław Burhardt's postulate of turning Poles to the sea came true.

As a scientific achievement I pointed out this monograph, as it is the result of my many years of research and examination related to the history of Poland at sea. The research areas that I mentioned have gradually brought me closer to the understanding of marine affairs and allowed me to formulate findings and "put forward" the diagnosis of the problem with greater courage and precision. In one of them I clearly stated that the Polish Baltic policy was short of continuity, whereas "acceding" to the sea at times failed to exert a greater influence on the social and economic life of the Republic of Poland. For decades, the belief has dominated or even persisted among the opinion-forming social communities that the Polish nobleman is not interested in sailing, because he can sell his goods on the spot without incurring risk and additional costs. There was no deep reflection on the "marine" message of Bishop Dmitry Solikowski, and a similar case was with the "the sea is our priority" appeal by Stanisław Staszic. Also important was the conclusion that the east-oriented Poland broke with the most natural direction of its development, towards the sea - the Baltic Sea. Stanisław Grabski pointed out the threat resulting from this policy, claiming: "Poland may exist without access to the Dnieper River, but it cannot exist without permanent access to the sea." Explaining this position, he concludes: "Poland's expansion towards the Baltic - it is also a fast industrialisation of Poland, development of towns, democratic civil culture. Poland's expansion eastwards - it is drawing Poland into the chaos of upheavals, it is the policy of unpredictable social experiments and frantic diplomatic and war risks." The events of the interwar period and the following years attested to the truth of his opinion.

From another perspective, but with equally deep anxiety, Bernard Chrzanowski wrote about these matters, emphasizing: "[...] either in painting or in our poetry or novels - the sea and the coastal Kashubian shore were as if not existent. [...] All the districts of the former Commonwealth; Lithuania and Polesia, Podolia and Ukraine, Kuyavia, Mazovia, Kielce and Cracow, the Podhale and Tatras have their painters and poets; The tens of names reminiscent of the lands and people of the Lithuanian backwater villages, the Neman banks, Podolia steppes, Podhale homesteads, Cracow villages, Kielce forests, Mazovian meadows, Kuyavian lands come to my mouth; but only the sea and coast." Barely optimistic was the conclusion of Piotr Paliński, who wrote "... Pomerania, and especially Kashubia for the further side of Poland, *terra incognita* - unknown land: it suffered an obvious handicap, and its inhabitants were considered incomplete Poles". Not only but also for these reasons, I found it expedient to delve into the social and political intricacies of maritime policy of the state. In any policy, including the maritime "not moral considerations and separate rules decides, wrote Stanisław Kozicki, but interests and views on the development of European affairs." Addressing the

issues of maritime policy and fleet issues in the European perspective, I did justice to the above postulate. Its advantage was that it brought "maritime Poland " to the right dimensions, without in any way taking away determination of the people involved in these processes.

When Poland gained access to the sea in 1920, political and socio-economic expectations resurfaced with reference to the modest, in every respect, but joyously welcome "piece of coast". The power of feeling was so great that a particular 'mystic of access to the sea' developed, and paying visits there became a "patriotic duty". I believe that on the brink of independence, the "maritime Poland" did not fall into the category of primary tasks. The fact that the maritime issues quickly prompted their rights stemmed from the threat of Polish *raison d'état*, which was particularly visible in Pomerania. The territorial and political structure of the "corridor", the Free City of Gdansk with the dominant German element, and the war in the east with distinct Gdansk accents awakened the deepest political and social unrest.

The celebration of Poland's wedding with the sea celebrated in Puck referred to the history and conscience, nonetheless it was definitely not enough to rebuild consciousness from land to sea-based and initiate multi-generational work for the sea and at sea. The fears that after the solemn mass and flaming speeches, the maritime affairs will resume the previous path prompted Mieczysław Burhardt to formulate a postulate that "the will to refrain from the sin against the Polish sea" be included in the Polish Constitution. It did not happen, and I believe it was right, because in the dawning of independence all areas of community life had the right to ask for similar treatment. "Resurrected" Poland, which I consistently reiterate, has become one big "construction site", both in the political as well as socio-economic spheres, where successes were intertwined with failures.

A few decades have passed from wedding to the sea in Puck, and from that perspective I have formulated a question about the maritime condition of the Republic set up between 1918 and 1989. This condition has resulted in the maritime safety of the state – leitmotif of the monograph submitted for assessment. I believe that the initial, as well as the final time line, are so clear that they require no support. In November 1918, the "resurrected" Poland commenced its difficult road to independence, and the year 1989 saw the end to the post-war period of its history of limited sovereignty and became the beginning of a free and independent Republic of Poland.

The "Maritime Poland" couples with socio-political life and history of this period. In this compound piece of terminology I have included the wealth and diversity of problems related to "access" to the sea, maritime policy and economy and the war fleet. It occurs a

number of times throughout this monograph and each time refers to the specific events and times in which they took place. In other words, I have dealt with maritime issues in all their complexity, in the category of the process, whose mechanisms depend on socio-political and economic potential of the state.

It is equally important that the " maritime Poland" was born and consolidated under the overwhelming influence of the international situation. It is deeply reasonable to argue that external pressures on a number of occasions disrupted the process of developing the foundations of maritime policy and management. This was the case both in the interwar years and after 1945, when the "cold war" generated excessive burden on the budget, at the expense of, among others, rational maritime economy. The general conclusion is that those were external threats, rather than the planned maritime policy of the state, that were factors stimulating the development of the war fleet. This dependence is also evident in the ongoing discussions about the condition and prospects of the modernisation (development) of the naval forces in the Republic of Poland.

The characteristic feature of the "maritime" of the interwar period was that nautical ideology was wandering in the fog of absurdity, by directing the Poles' thoughts towards the maritime power, or was drowning in the flood of resentments that the citizens were inert in indifference to maritime affairs. It was not my intention to support one of these options and recruit followers for it, but the genuine and rational assessment of the project of "Maritime Poland". In an attempt to fulfil this task I used the suggestion of Professor Roman Wapinski to view maritime affairs including the war fleet, from a broader perspective than that available from the deck of warship. The midship location itself is unique in its own right, and numerous historical and nautical works dedicated to the Polish Navy show this trait. The perspective that I "used" did not diminish the role of the war fleet, but caused it to become a real being, devoid of unnecessary adjectives such as "small, of a buoyant spirit." It is important inasmuch as that the real threats, especially war, reveal all the weaknesses, and in fact become the only verifier of the qualification of the soldier and the tools of battle.

I submit a monograph with a clearly outlined problematic layout. My starting point were the maritime achievements of the interwar years which provided the foundation for discussing the fleet of the war, with its spectacular successes and problems that put it in a situation of "unfeasibility of task" in September 1939. I intentionally challenged one of the fundamental theses duplicated in maritime historiography that those were consecutive Admirals that were the founders of the war fleet. I do strongly believe, and I have made an attempt to demonstrate it, the navy was set up the Republic of Poland, and it was the latter

that was responsible for its state and ability to perform its tasks. The decisions made, as well as their absence, reflected the responsibility for the state's maritime safety. This was the case in the inter-war years, and similarly after 1945, with obvious consideration of the alliance's dependence and relationships. The general conclusion is that Poland was too weak, especially in terms of economy, and thus was unable to build up a war fleet adequate to the expressed vision of the maritime state. For a good reason, I recalled that already in 1925, two questions about the future of "Maritime Poland" were formulated, the one, whether Poland could afford the war fleet, and the other, what kind of war fleet Poland needed? The fact that no discussions on maritime issues were triggered in their context at that time had the widest consequences, of which, I think, we have not liberated ourselves up to the present day. This was also a case with the "invitation" extended by Józef Marlicz, PhD, to pursue a broader debate on the state's maritime policy. It was then (1925) deemed that theoretical considerations were a waste of time and that the positive action was the best response to emerging challenges. I do not share this approach, and I believe it is wrong that in the then Sejm, under the motto "Poland from the sea to the sea", no such discussion was embarked on in order to become aware the scale of challenges and costs. It is important inasmuch as that the "Polish intermarum" is still present in the political and social discourse.

Next, I pointed out and specified the causes of the gradual disintegration of the Versailles deal, highlighting in particular the maritime and Pomeranian issues. I pointed out the actions of Polish diplomacy, which manifestly weakened the post- Versailles Europe, and consequently aggravated the conditions of safety at that time. I believe that in the segments of events that I was interested in, the situation became critical when in May-June 1939 the French and Britons made it clear that the Baltic theatre of war was outside the zone of their operational interest, which in consequence rendered the defence of "Maritime Poland" an unfeasible task. I did not attempt to highlight the "sins" of our allies because how else they were supposed to act in a situation where Pomerania, on considering its "specificity", was excluded from effective operational planning. If in this situation it was reasonable to redeploy part of the war fleet into Great Britain, it was meaningless or irrational to decide to leave "Gryf", "Wicher" and submarines, exclusively for "political-prestige" purposes. As regards the above-mentioned redeployment, I expressed a less optimistic view and made a strong point that the naval fleet was built to defend the Polish maritime *raison d'état*, and not for the needs of the British ally, which were playing the "Polish card" since March 1939.

I refuted the view that the "Gdańsk issue" was a detonator of the war, but I share the opinion of many historians and politologists that it became an illustrious argument, especially

in the then propaganda, which at least temporarily waved away suspicions from the main actors of the European political scene interested in the demolition of the Versailles system. The inevitability of war was inscribed in the political logic of interwar Europe. Poland overestimated its political and military assets, and joined this game and faced the choice between honour and humiliation. It has chosen the former! Was not the price paid for this choice excessively high, this makes one of the questions which continues to persist in the discussion between generations? I took the floor and formulated the view that Polish foreign policy was not always adequately responsive to the dynamic situation in the European social and political space. The paralysis (low tide) specified in this paper, in particular, distinguished this policy in the years of World War II and in the post-war period when it became hostage to the alliance not of its own choice.

I referred to a comprehensive analysis of the views, decisions, and actions that paved the way to coastal isolation and dramatically woken up Poles of their dream of "maritime Poland". The fleet of war of which they were so proud, which was to be the guarantor of the "maritime raison d'état" ceased to operate in the Baltic region on the sixth day of the war. Hel's capitulation marked the end of the tragedy. As regards the extensive chapter 2, I deliberately focus attention on the subsection *September 1939 - in defence of "Maritime Poland"*, which I consider to be particularly important for the question of maritime safety of the state, and I do not refer solely to Poland in political and territorial configuration in 1939. Already the first issue contained in the question of whether the "Polish raison d'état" is located at the Baltic Sea prompted me to deny the view currently prevailing among a number of maritime historians willing to assign disproportionate to the reality political and economic role to the Polish coast.

I made an attempt to clearly articulate that the Second Republic of Poland, apart from the Gdynia complex, called the pearl of the twentieth century, did not post spectacular success in Pomerania. It is not far-going to suggest that the Polish presence is hardly making its way here, and let us add that it is not the fault of the local element. One more serious conclusion comes from my analysis, namely, that the maritime and Pomeranian affairs were somehow developing off the mainstream of state life and were "troublesome" for the "corridors of power", especially when they called for funds. This was the case of the port in Gdynia, similar anxiety stemmed from the needs of the war fleet. One has to wonder at the far-reaching inconsistency, inasmuch as that excluding Pomerania from effective operational planning, the port of Gdynia, one of the pivotal from the operational viewpoint projects of the twentieth century which could not be defended by the method of isolated measures, was in fact pushed

into the "corridor". I have consistently supported the view that the responsibility for the maritime safety of the state should not rely on the generally modest fleet of the war, but should be comprehensively covered within the decision-make of the authorities of the Republic of Poland. The war fleet, which I emphasised, was only one of marine safety tools. Its assessment proves the weak socio-economic condition of the state and a lack of consistent views on maritime and Pomeranian matters vis-à-vis the threat.

Due to the political rhetoric and propaganda of the interwar period many of the seafarers were inclined to see the Polish Navy as a guardian of the naval interests of the state - Polish *raison d'état*. Indeed, the maritime idea was the most natural carrier of freedom, in both socio-economic and political sense. This was confirmed by the experience of states with a well-established presence at sea, which inspired the advocates of "maritime Poland". This was reflected in extensive naval journalism, in which the "maritime" nature of the Republic of Poland was presumably exaggerated and the navy fleet was charged with tasks that it was not able to perform. In fact, we were dealing with the "maritime Poland" deeply-rooted in the sphere of feelings and imagination, which in no way influenced the realities of the state that was rebuilding its independence. The pressure of external threats was in conflict with the logic I put forward - first of all, the construction and development of the maritime economy and then the navy fleet as a guarantee of security. I will reiterate that maritime affairs should be viewed comprehensively **as a national task inscribed in the maritime policy of the state**. I have referred to a number arguments pointing out that this logic was lacking.

No doubt, one can not underestimate the fact that Poland was "born in the boom of cannons", and when they ceased to operate, it was subjected to strong political pressure under the leadership of defeated Germany and Soviet Russia. They were encouraged by the policy of the United Kingdom, which believed that "Poland was doomed to failure and the sooner it would happen, the sooner the relations in Europe would stabilise." This was undoubtedly an important reason why security issues were given a special priority. In Pomerania, due to tense Polish-Gdansk relations and the specifics of the "corridor" these turbulences were particularly visible. Already in 1924 the view was promoted in the British public space that the Pomeranian corridor was a "poor solution" that would trigger a European war. To evade this scenario, a proposal was formulated: the return of Gdańsk to Germany and the construction of two railway lines under German rule. In return, Germany "would guarantee Poland's eastern borders", which were considered Polish security bastion. It should be noted that the politicians drawing the map of Europe in Paris were inclined to approach the Germans gently and did not conceal their belief that Poles would not be able to create a strong and stable state. The

opinions referring to historical and social justice had no major or even any significance, because no moral considerations and absolute principles determined the politics of "Versailles", but interests and views on the development of European affairs. One may wonder whether the Europe today does not resemble that climate?

State security, also at sea, derives from the politics. My strong belief in this dependence made me turn so much attention to European and internal politics in the years 1918 - 1989. The way in which Poland established its place, first within the "restraints" of Versailles, and next in Yalta, determined its sense of security. For obvious reasons, expressed in the subtitle of this monograph, I have limited these issues to maritime affairs. I have no doubt that the introduction of the thesis of the "Polish maritime *raison d'état*" into social communication lacked sufficient power based on the potential of the state, and created a climate in which sea reality was rather "patched up" with wishful thinking than the possibilities. For this reason, one of the subsections of monograph was included in the question: *we can access the sea - and what next?* The paradox of the situation is that we could repeat this question today. I believe that this should be dealt with as soon as possible, so that the next generations will not accuse today's decision makers of the sin of abandonment of the "Polish sea". Publications on the current state of the navy, and rather the lack of it, are seething with emotion and indignation. The average age of ships in line (33 years) must be the reason for this anxiety. Mieczysław Burhardt's appeal to insert the relevant clause in the Constitution dedicated to the affairs of the sea comes back like the boomerang.

On considering the above, my aim was not to write yet another "true story" of the Polish Navy, but to generalise the test results so far and to make objective examination and assessment of its combat potential and position in the defence system of the state, in its maritime policy. By outlining the research problem I placed it in a broader, transnational socio-political perspective, because it was the only perspective that allowed me to verify opinions and assessments deeply rooted in the Polish mindset. I think, and I emphasise that reaching out to sea, not against someone, but to share in its "cultivation" is deeply meaningful and that the war fleet should also serve this purpose. The war was a difficult but transitional experience, and it may not be the only (exclusive) reference point for the assessment of the naval fleet whose main task is the maritime safety of the state, understood as a condition in which it fulfills the tasks inscribed in its political and socioeconomic logic. .

I must say clearly that it is not easy to deal with the matter clasped between two distinct symbols: the figure of Marshal Józef Piłsudski and the Monument to the Seafarers. The former is credited with Poland's going out to sea, and I think that this is definitely an

overstatement, while the monument itself requires respect and moderation in the distribution of merit. Bearing that in mind, I made an attempt to explore to the maximum the "opening balance" of hard-won independence. It is not just a matter of borders, with the "Pomeranian corridor" including relations with the Free City of Gdansk, but above all the reconstruction of the awareness that finally Poland is our own and we are building our future together. This also referred to the issue which I called "maritime independence". It was a task inasmuch important as it was a completely novelty for the vast majority of Poles in the socio-economic as well as in the political-military sense. It was the postulate of "turning Poles to the sea" that was important in this situation, in which one should see the revival of the Staszic's idea of "the sea is our priority". Providing the question mark to the subsection: *We can access the sea - and what next?*, I clearly suggested that it was easier to get to the sea than to turn this "piece of coast" to a useful political and socio-economic advantage for the state. I did not stand away from controversy, and repeatedly pointed out that the political turmoil within the country favored foreign centers that, for various reasons, questioned or did not intend to accept the "resurrected" Republic of Poland. I stand to the thesis that many countries were accustomed to the absence of Poland on the political map of Europe, which undoubtedly favoured anti-Polish sentiments in the politics of Germany and Soviet Russia. Too often, Poles were reminded and reproached that they were given independence, which was supposed to render Poland a hostage for the policies of the victorious powers, both after World War I and World War II. The important question that underlies the entire narrative is whether Poland developed a coherent concept of national maritime policy. I took a position on this issue in opposition to the opinion of many authors, and stressed that such policy was not worked out, and its ephemeral fragments should not serve to create mythology that "Poland was based on the sea". I clearly remarked that I appreciated the importance of Gdynia, but it did not grow on the ground of this policy, but it was rather inspired by the conflict with Gdańsk and this situation persisted until the outbreak of war. And finally, a great part of the first chapter was dedicated to the fleet of war, where my reflections on this subject were based on two key issues, what fleet of war and whether Poland could afford the war fleet? It should be borne in mind that these questions were put in place in 1925 and have not been really answered by 2017. And yet, it contains the key to the issue of the major role of the tool that the state has been equipped with to guarantee security at sea. In this part of monograph, a very clear and prominent view was expressed that the poor state could not afford a war fleet. Enthusiasm of citizens should be appreciated, but it is not enough to build the gravity of the state at sea.

In the following subsections, I referred to the events that were gradually disrupting Europe and the individual states from the order established by the Versailles Treaty. The fact that it would be impermanent was first heralded of those who conceived it and enforced it at the then Europe. Basically, it would be difficult to identify at least one country, including Poland, which would not raise its objections to the principles of the post-Versailles international order. I quoted a number of opinions for and against the Versailles order, and they all led to one conclusion that another armed confrontation was inevitable. Geopolitics determined our failures on the international scene, which does not relieve us from ignoring the numerous errors committed by political parties at home. Someone might enquire about the connection between the "Czechoslovakian case" and sea security of the state. Surely, the connection was minor if we judge these issues in purely geographical terms. In turn, it proved to be very large when we view the security of the state in complex manner, aware of the fact that it is not a value given once and for all. The interwar period was such a "theatre", in which events surpassed even outstanding actors. There was no abundance of diplomatic talents on the Polish political scene. We entered alliances in which our subjectivity was not always respected, but sometimes we provided reasons for it. The basic premise of the Polish-French alliance of 1921 that Germany would be its political-military bindings did not stand the test of time. It must be clearly stated that both parties felt constrained and gradually freeing themselves from their obligations, and Germany was the sole beneficiary of the situation. The comments I made on this point led to the basic conclusion that in the "decisive hand" - the game" was played over Poland, not about Poland".

I believe that the naivety of the Polish political-military leaders was to expect that the armada of British and French warships would enter the Baltic Sea to conduct joint operations with the Polish Navy. It is not pointless to recall that the war port of Gdynia was built with the view that it would be Soviet Russia that would be the enemy. And if so, it was necessary to have a port and a reloading base that would take supplies from the allied states (France and Great Britain) and armaments to the army, and the case of 1920s would not be repeated, when the dockers of Gdansk blocked the landing of war material for combat troops on the Eastern front. The calculations in question lost any sense when the Third Reich in the form of an ultimatum communicated Poland its demand (position) with reference to Gdansk and the "Pomeranian Corridor". The British guarantees, I strongly emphasised it, were not expressions of warm feelings for Poland, but an attempt to save the prestige of the Empire, which in its pacifism denied its solemnity and lost its influence on European affairs.

I agree with Ignacy Matuszewski's thesis that in certain situations "geography is a more powerful weapon of war than a tank or cannon." The example of Gdansk and the "Pomeranian corridor" was the most evident proof. Again, I would like to reiterate that the then geopolitics excluded the possibility of Polish-British-French co-operation in the Baltic Sea. It also coincided with the Baltic geography, where the ships were like "mice in a trap" after blocking the Danish straits. This dependence both the British as well as the French discovered already in the seventeenth century and I was not able to understand why this obvious issue with so much difficulty found its way to the minds of the Polish military representatives.

One of the important questions for me was whether the Polish *raison d'état* was concentrated around the Baltic Sea? It did not occur by a mere chance, because throughout the nearly all twentieth century the citizens were made to believe that it was a fact of life. Pomerania and the border have were assigned with a meaning that was in no way compatible to the general policy of the state between Berlin and Moscow, with the indeterminate role of Paris and London. Piłsudski was right when he communicated it straight in the eyes of the French foreign minister that the French would not fight against the Germans and should "give" weapons to Poles who were so ready. I have also dedicated a few reflections to this issue, because I believe that we made the national willingness to die for and instead of others our national trait, without the equivalent stance of the French and the British. It had its far-reaching repercussions during the war.

I endeavoured to articulate the inconsistency between operational planning and strategic projects in the threatened Pomerania region. One such was the port of Gdynia, which, as it was said from the first decisions on its construction, in view of the uncertain or even hostile attitude of Gdansk, was regarded as the project of primarily military profile. The element of incoherence here originated from the fact that the "corridor", due to its location and spatial structure, was already excluded from effective operational planning already in the early 1920s. And rightly so, since several divisions of the army could not be entered into the "space" that would doom them to be cut off and encircled. If it was decided that Pomerania would not be defended, the citizens should not be misled with the statements that Poland was growing in strength and stood ready to repel any threat. It is in this context that one should examine and assess the decision to move part of the war fleet to Great Britain even before the outbreak of war. I did not share the opinion of a large group of maritime experts who, in the "Peking" plan, saw a brilliant move that led the Polish Navy to fight from the "first to the last salvo". The Second Republic of Poland was building its Navy to defend its naval interests,

which were put at risk in September 1939. Since the argument behind the departure of some of the ships was the disproportion of forces (in the clash with Germany), how could one leave the remainder without changing the tasks for it? It is hard to argue with the logic of a witness of the events, captain Steyer, who at that time blamed the staff that had taken that decision for the "lack of rational planning" and "mental retardation". It should be added here that it has more diehard followers who forget, however, that any evaluation separated from time and place is of little cognitive value. They enter into a worthless mythology, in which Hel stood "on guard."

State security at sea is the sum of the actions taken under the planned maritime policy. I have already said that the war fleet is only one of the tools of this policy, which does not diminish its role and significance. It is a wrong to narrow the matter exclusively to the classes and types of warships and, by the total tonnage of the fleet, we estimate the maritime defence potential of the state. I wrote about the fact that war ships could be acquired by placing orders with foreign shipyards, and that was the case during the interwar period, since the industry did not allow Poland to build them in a domestic shipyard. Surely, it had its weaknesses, because the loan granted by France remained in the yards (arms) of our most important ally instead of supplying the home industry. It is not without a reason to quote in his monograph an important warning, which says that "whoever takes liberty from someone else's hands, is addicted". It may be of multiple nature and occur at different times, even today. Politics, including the maritime one, must take this aspect into account, not necessarily making it the argument of the various political and social campaigns.

While examining the issues of maritime safety, I emphasised the aspects related to the safeguarding of fleet operations. This is a fundamental role. This was justly expressed by captain W. B. Steyer, who used a comparison that "the bridge is as strong as the weakest of its span". By analogy, we can say that the war fleet will do the job insofar as its base allows it to do that. Well, the key to the September tragedy was the base, its weakness, inability to secure and support ship operations. Bearing in mind the above, I have dedicated a lot of space to this issue, and the final conclusions have confirmed the concept that the fleet's weakness in September 1939 was due to the weakness of the base. Maritime base is a "place" properly prepared and defended, in which ships replenish their supplies, reconstruct combat readiness, carry out repairs, seek refuge, get support for their actions, and also the ally's advantage. The Polish Navy was short of that base in 1939. The British and the French knew this, which further discouraged them from entering the Baltic. The Polish Navy leadership was also aware of this, and therefore was seeking to send part of the fleet to Great Britain. If commanders of

ships have no confidence in their own base, then one should not expect them to sacrifice themselves entirely to combat. In September 1939, the commanders and crew of the ships fought for survival without any support from the base. Calculating how many kilometres of cables, railroads were laid, how much concrete was poured out, how many tunnels were hollowed and how many silos were built on Hel, how long quayside was built, do not change my opinion that it was not adapted to the role that it was intended for during wartime.

The thesis that ships targeting British ports have launched a new chapter in the ongoing war is extensively covered in the Polish maritime historiography. I argue with the patriotic hint occurring in this venture, especially since these steps were taken in secret from the crews of ships. And trust is what creates the *l'esprit de corps*. Many writers were unwilling or unable to notice that while the ships were implementing the "Peking" plan, Great Britain was indeed far from declaring the war against Germany. It reached its goal, entangled Poland in the war, picked up, although not much, but the best part of the Polish fleet and was ready to sign a pact with Hitler himself, because after all, the Londoners used to say: why the war for Gdansk is a German city, and if so, it was right that the Germans took it. I often recall that the history is written by the winners. That's how it happened also this time, this part of history was written by the officers of the Polish Navy, who saved their heads from the September oppression, on the decks of "Burza", "Grom" and "Błyskawica". More decency was preserved by young commanders who did not hide their bitterness over leaving the fighting team at the moment of hardest attempt. It's just symbols, but so meaningful for the assessment of "Maritime Poland", which World War II threw into the rough sea of history.

The Polish navy fleet under the British operational command perfectly illustrates a fragment of the political process in which the "closest and most loyal" ally evolves towards the most "problematic" one. I believe that this is part of our history, including the history of the armed forces, to which we dedicate definitely not enough space. At first we "drowned" these issues in the Polish-Soviet alliance and later, within the framework of the new alliance correctness, no one was supposed to speak about them, and yet these are important issues for understanding the whole historical process completed with the Sovietisation of Poland. The examination of extensive historiography and source material prompted me to conclude that the Polish issue had been determined long before the Tehran Conference. The Polish Army in the West, and subsequently in the east it was also a "bleeding" decoration for "political maneuvers" in which the "Polish affair" became the most embarrassing for the Big Three.

In my examination, I highlighted the issue where Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister explained General Sikorski that those counted in the winning game that could

provide one million soldiers. It was in 1940. It was just a signal, but already very eloquent that there was no place for Poland reserved in this exclusive club, because the country could not afford the assets that were expected. It is not without reason that in my narrative the year 1943 would return, as a breakthrough for the Polish cause. The "Controversies and Conflicts" dividing the Poles, both as regards the assessment of September and the future of Poland, favoured political forces, both in the east and in the west, which were escalating the opinion that as a nation we are incapable of independent statehood.

In the convention I assumed the title of Chapter 3: *In the (post)war reality* should not be a surprise. In the war-ravaged country, both political and social priorities were determined by the Cold War. Independence, regardless of how it was seen from the perspective of the spring of 1945, was also limited by the presence of the Red Army on the Polish territory, and it remained so until 1993. I came back to the events of the twentieth century not without a reason, when the most important question prevailing in the social space was: what kind of Poland? Please note, it has been 25 years and this question has come back with double strength and has preoccupied Poles for several decades to resume its original character at the current juncture. For the issues of interest to me, the problems of political resolutions guaranteeing the return of Poland to the Baltic was crucial. I am aware that the word "guaranteeing" had a completely different political context during the war years. I pointed out examples of the fact that nobody really wanted to guarantee anything to Poland. The fact that the post-war "maritime Poland" was conceived in London was a natural thing, because it was necessary to arrange for the development of the country upon liberation. Poland was free, in the literal sense, because freedom was fought for and expected. In thus understood freedom, the "territorial" and political "safeguards" were inscribed, which were not available to the Second Republic of Poland. The London concept lost in political terms, because the Soviets viewed the western and midnight lands as a prey of war and to a great extent limited Polish maritime sovereignty on those areas. I believe that even under these conditions, the Poles have done titanic work to meet the "maritime and Pomeranian" challenges which, from the perspective of 1945, appeared to be the most urgent. The term "Polish *raison d'état*" featured the same economic and social power in the first post-war years as the "maritime patriotism" of the 1930s.

The "Baltic watch" in the new political and social realities was one of the most serious challenges for the seafarers. The post-war maritime narration was dominated by the martyrological theme. I do not disregard it, nonetheless I believe that the social and economic losses that Poland suffered when it broke with pre-war maritime profile were the more

important issue. In any case, it must be clearly stated that if this continuity had been maintained, then there the "night of commanders" would have not occurred. The blow on the pre-war maritime environment had manifold consequences, and it bore the heaviest brunt on the "reborn" Poland, which for political and ideological reasons rejected the material and intellectual heritage of the inter-war into the wastebasket of history. Fleet warfare, I reiterated it on many occasions, is not established overnight. It is similar to the development and education of marine personnel, which must be "developed", and it is a process that lasts for generations. Rejection of "continuity and tradition" was one of the most serious mistakes committed by people who did not understand the marine environment. I can repeat the above-expressed thought that warships can be bought or built in foreign shipyards, while people need to be trained and educated and they constitute the greatest value in this "continuity and tradition". Even this fact shows that maritime issues had to be excluded from the "ideological mill" and allow them to develop on the pre-war keel. It happened differently and it is the experience from which the seafarers drew the most profound lessons.

This monograph covers 44 years of naval history and experience, which was preceded by the adjective "people's" in numerous publications. I referred to this terminology and shared the opinion of this part of my interlocutors, for whom the Polish Army and Navy have always dressed white and red colours without ideological adjectives or other deviations. I pointed out clearly that in the examined period we dealt with two different fleets, because this was a socio-political reality, on which Poland had had a limited influence. The maritime safety of the state was the factor which made these fleets look similar. Though in fact they operated in a very different international reality, they always required similar high seas and specialised qualifications. It is only the assessment of the latter that seems reasonable, because we lack objective criteria for measuring ideological involvement, after all. By taking unquestioning reference to statistics we can come up with absurd conclusions, which I commented on in a subsection entitled "Baltic Watch" in the new political and social realities.

The issue of the Warsaw Pact, in its nautical issue was undoubtedly the problem carrying a serious research risk. I could not overlook this area of maritime experience of the armed forces, as for several decades the United Baltic Fleet, not being a formal structure, existed as an expression of an allied will to cooperate for the sake of maritime security of the alliance. Poland, which I clearly emphasised, was a part of it in proportion to its economic capabilities. I would like to emphasise clearly that the archival documentation of the maritime part of the Warsaw Pact is more optimistic than the dimension of actual cooperation I have drafted on the basis of interviews with the navy authorities of the Republic of Poland.

Whereas the alliance was covered with a thick layer of propaganda, it had to perform a responsible function in a divided, cold-war world. From this perspective, the objective was achieved and the maritime safety of the state preserved.

By way of summarising the above comments, I would like to emphasise that while working on this monograph, I was driven by the desire to go beyond the prevailing canon, that the Polish Navy is a national good that by its very existence deserves the highest, even patriotic assessment. The "small fleet of buoyant spirit" theory perfectly illustrated this conditions, and by disregarding this factor it was easy to come into conflict with the moods and emotions of the milieu, which contributed to developing a kind of emotional cover around the youngest branch of armed forces. I weighed the reasons and arguments as I wanted to create a "work" that would be analytical in its content, facilitating the formulation of individual findings, while also comprehensible and provoking the discussion. It was not supposed to be another "beautiful" story about the Polish Navy, but a scientific dissertation in which the question of the maritime policy of the state is the essence and the security of the state at sea is one of its important elements. The war fleet is viewed here in the category of tool that the state has in place so that it guarantees the state safe reaching out to the sea and "using" it. This "tool", as it was strongly emphasised, has not been an independent organisational entity. The Navy Fleet is the task of the state, which participates in the operation and distribution of maritime goods. It is also a measure of its civilisation and economic potential, because the sea is a very demanding "partner" or "opponent". It is also for this reason, the advocates of maritime policy have emphasises that this is a task whose prospect is defined for decades rather than day by day. I entirely share this view.

The research area and time interval allowed me to conduct a comparative analysis immersed in the richness of World history and international relations of exceptional dynamics. I quite deliberately omitted the orders and regulations that accounted for the mundane daily life of a ship and garrison, and the tactical and technical data of ships and armaments that attract the attention of a large group of researchers. I deemed that they were of a negligible value for this analysis and synthesis. The war fleet, which I put in the title of monograph, was the reference point for the question of maritime safety of the state. It is an important tool of the safety, but it does not exist separately from the state's socio-economic policy and life, and especially from its defence strategy. What is important, in the examined period, we were faced with the overwhelming influence of external factors, and this is because the Second Republic of Poland based its maritime policy and safety on strong allied ties and investment projects financed by foreign capital. Following 1945, the vectors of

dependence changed, Poland found itself in the zone of Soviet influence, which further limited its decision-making and investment projects autonomy in the area of maritime affairs, including the war fleet.

This approach to maritime issues and the research conducted in this area led me to formulate the following conclusions:

- Maritime security of the state is a complex socio-political, economic and military process that aims to ensure that all actors involved in the "cultivation" of the sea may perform their tasks effectively;
- Looking back is important, but we must not underestimate the fact that we are witnessing a change in the international situation, that terrorism and asymmetric threats determine a new horizon of responsibility, including in maritime safety;
- The war fleet is one of the tools of the state to ensure its maritime security, it is not created by a "decree", but it is a resultant of the decisions setting political and socio-economic direction that determine what kind of the war fleet the state will have at its disposal, how it intends to use it in specific situations of threat;
- Maritime policy of the state is a pan-national task, not a sectoral one, and requires relevant legislative tools, socio-economic tools, intellectual background and long-term and rational planning;
- In the years 1918-1989, no coherent maritime policy was established, which would place Poland among the countries traditionally referred to as the maritime; excessive ambitions expressed in the form of colonial and imperial overtones were not conducive to the rationalisation of our national expectations towards the sea;
- The value of the Polish Navy has been a "human factor" that will be able to fully utilise its specialised qualifications and ethical and professional values, being equipped with modern ships and marine equipment;
- I have deliberately decided to examine the issues related to maritime safety and war fleet in a broader historical and international context because only this perspective allowed me to objectify my assessments and bring our overly exploited "maritime ego" to the right proportion;
- *Strategic Maritime Safety Concept of the Republic of Poland*, published on 10 February 2017, shares many of my views, especially in the part concerning the organic relationship between the state and its possibilities for reaching out to the sea, including the military fleet;

5. Other scientific achievements

Having been awarded with a doctoral degree, I ran the following research projects:

- statutory research work codenamed " Błyskawica" - Place of the Polish Navy in the system of defence of the country in 1945-1989;
- statutory research work codenamed "Morus" - Scientists at the Polish Naval Academy in the years 1955 - 2004;
- statutory research work codenamed "Adhara" - In the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland (Polish People's Republic) in the years 1921 - 1989 about the war fleet and the maritime policy of the state;
- statutory research work codenamed "Perseusz" - Navy in the Polish People's Republic as a factor of socio-political and economic development of Pomerania;
- statutory research work codenamed "Śnieżka" (currently implemented) - About the condition of the Polish Navy from the perspective of its development of financial expenditures in the years 1918-2014;
- grant financed under the programme of the Minister of Science and Higher Education under the name "National Programme for the Development of the Humanities" pk. " Jastrząb" - Maritime Militaria (19 - 20 century). History - education - tourism;

Honours:

- 2008 - Special Prize for contribution to dissemination of scientific achievements of the Polish Naval Academy professors;
- 2010 - Polish Naval Academy Rector's Award of the second degree for original and creative scientific achievements in the field of military history;
- 2013 - Polish Naval Academy Rector's Award of the third degree for publication and development "Counter Admiral Hieronim Henryk Pietraszkiewicz - This was war that has made me a soldier";
- 2015 - Polish Naval Academy Rector's Award of the third degree for organisational activity in the academic year 2014/2015;
- 2015 - Polish Naval Academy Rector's Award of the first degree for publications;
- 2016 - Polish Naval Academy Rector's Award of the third degree for organisational activity in the term of office of the Vice-Dean for Science of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in the years 2012-2016;

Teaching:

- I co-authored the curriculum of the first and second course of studies in the field of history;
- I placed the application for the establishment of the Chair of Maritime Studies at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, I developed the scope of its tasks;
- I co-authored the curriculum of the first course of studies in the field of Maritime Studies;
- I have successfully supervised 49 master's degree student and 76 bachelor's degree students;
- I reviewed 52 master's theses and bachelor's theses;

Organizing activities:

- I co-organised three consecutive world congresses of seafarers;
- 2009 - Nationwide Scientific Conference – View of September 1939 from the sea and Pomerania;
- 2014 - Nationwide Scientific Conference - Militaria in Historical Education;
- 2016 - XIII National Forum of Military Historians;
- 2014 - study trip for students of history – along the route of the fortification of West Pomerania;
- I initiated the conclusion of three agreements with upper secondary schools and two agreements with local governments on teaching and educational cooperation;
- Member of the Main Board of the Association of Military Historians;
- In the years 2011-2014 - member of the Peer Tribunal of the Second Instance of the Common Association of Historians;
- Member of Editorial Board of Colloquium quarterly;

I have been awarded numerous medals and ministerial awards, including the Medal of the National Education Commission, for my work as well as teaching and educational activities.

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