Virtue & Moral Education

GDAŃSK, 17–18 MAY 2018

UNIWERSYTET GDAŃSKI

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Virtue & Moral Education

GDAŃSK, 17–18 MAY 2018

Abstracts

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Contents

**The University
of Gdańsk**
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE │ **2**

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

**The University
of Oklahoma**
The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **3**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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WHAT DOES THE STUDENT OF ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE NEED TO KNOW?

I borrow Rosalind Hursthouse's title, "What does the Aristotelian phronimos need to know?" because the way Hursthouse understands the perspective of the phronimos is bad news for the student of virtue. It suggests that the knowledge of the phronimos is such that the student cannot come to know it. I ask what it is to learn to be virtuous, a question I will consider from the perspective of the student of virtue.

The requirement for education not just central but essential to virtue ethics. An understanding of the good life as a practical pursuit imposes obligations on the adherents of the theory to offer some kind of helpful account of its practice. However, the most promising avenue for assistance, the idea of the virtuous person as a role model, seems to be a dead end because of two objections. The first objection argues that the virtuous occupies a privileged standpoint that can neither be understood nor shared by the student. The second objection points out that the educational needs of the one on the road to virtue, the student, are entirely different from the example offered by the virtuous.

In order to overcome these objections:

I offer a new role for the virtuous person. Rather than a difficult to find, direct model, which is impossible to copy, or an embodiment of a perspective the student stands outside of, the virtuous is a model for emulation, someone to aspire to.

The University of Gdańsk

The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **4**

Virtue & Moral Education

Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma

The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

I suggest that pedagogical advice can come from many other sources. The continent are a good example of the right action, those who can perform the right action when it is easy to do so are good examples of what to do in the numerous situations where it is easy to do the right thing, and failures can be good role models of mistakes, weaknesses and what to avoid.

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 5

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University
of Oklahoma
The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

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CAN LITERATURE CONTRIBUTE
TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL CHARACTER?
(THE POSNER-NUSSBAUM-BOOTHE DEBATE)

The relationship between aesthetics and ethics is a complex one. The ongoing debate in aesthetics focuses on the question whether ethical value can contribute to aesthetic value of artworks. However, there is also another, less popular debate on the intersection of aesthetics, ethics and literary theory, approaching the interconnections between arts and ethics from different points of view. One of these perspectives elaborates on the relationship between the arts (especially literature or, more generally, narrative arts) and their audience (readers, viewers). The issues discussed from this perspective can be gathered under one umbrella question: Can (/should/how) art contribute to making us better people?

In my presentation, I would like to take up this question and discuss its context and two approaches which I provisionally divided in the following way: (1) what ethics has to offer to literature (exemplified by Wayne C. Booth's theory of books as friends); (2) what literature has to offer to ethics (Martha Nussbaum's theory). Both approaches have been criticized by Richard Posner, and his criticism has become an impulse to a very interesting polemics between these three intellectuals. The final part of my presentation will include a reconstruction and evaluation of this debate.

**The University
of Gdańsk**
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | **6**

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

**The University
of Oklahoma**
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for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

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THE ACCESSORINESS OF MORAL EDUCATION TO KANT'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Kant has a sophisticated and detailed theory of moral education, and he reserves a special place in both his writings and lectures to discuss the proper methods for fostering a moral character. In *Tugendlehre,* however, he bluntly rejects the possibility of an obligation to promote the moral perfection, i.e., virtue, of others and argues for no more than a negative duty to others' moral well- being. Kant's account of moral judgement and rational agency support self-reliant moral development, but the fact that he explicitly and repeatedly describes virtue as something to be *taught* raises the question as to who needs to be the teacher(s), to which Kant himself does not provide an answer in *Tugendlehre.* The task of this paper will be (1) to explicate, with regard to Kant's idea of unsocial sociability, the duties of virtue in terms of their practical efficiency in contributing to the moral perfection of other human beings, and (2) to argue, on that basis, for the accessoriness of the doctrines of moral education, as opposed to the centrality of natural teleology, to Kant's theory of moral development. In this regard, every human being is naturally a teacher of virtue for other human beings; although there is no direct duty to promote the moral perfection of others, each and every human being contributes to this end by simply fulfilling their duties. Ultimately, I argue, the methods of moral education are not at

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 7

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University
of Oklahoma
The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

all indispensable, but they nevertheless support and quicken the process of natural moral development, and, for that reason, need to be further developed in the light of moral principles and scientific advances.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **8**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

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EDUCATING TO A RIGHT SELF-LOVE

This paper addresses right self-love conceived as one of the main components of a virtuous life. I will claim that, without a proper amount of self-love, one would be at the mercy of competing emotions like envy, resentment, quickness to take offense and the so-called "surprising dispositions" (C. Miller). However, I will also show that these emotions can become an invaluable help in order to purify one's self-love and one's relationships with other people.

If one of the main moral issues is to know one's right value and to love oneself, at least implicitly, according to the Aristotelian right mean (nor too much, neither too less), how can this ideal be effectively pursued? My aim in this paper is to show that right self-love is not mere spontaneous self-concern, but requires lifelong education and self-education. A central role is played, within this process, by the development of practical wisdom made possible by good friendships, i.e., relations grounded in a genuine agreement about objective goods (and not in mere pleasure or usefulness). Such friendships are marked by conversations about matters of importance to both friends, which shape the shared sensibility that guides their activity. In these friendships, the capacity to love ourselves and the capacity to love others arise together. True friendship requires, on the one hand, an appreciation of our friends and of ourselves in light of the objective good we both acknowledge and for which we both strive; on the other hand, it requires - in

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 9

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University
of Oklahoma
The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

light of the same good - the honesty to acknowledge our own shortcomings and those of our friends. Both attitudes foster a right self-love. Therefore, in order to love ourselves in the right way we need to transcend ourselves by means of our friends. Encouraging such good friendships is one of moral education's main aims.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **10**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

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EDUCATING THROUGH EPISTEMIC EXEMPLARS

The aim of this paper is to investigate the consequences of Linda Zagzebski's exemplarism for the education of the intellectual character. Her recent book, Exemplarist Moral Theory, provides further support for the thesis that admiring and emulating moral exemplars is a fundamental step towards the apprehension of moral virtues. A close—yet still underestimated—question is whether the same approach can be adopted towards the education to intellectual virtues. The broad thesis I am going to defend is that Zagzebski's insights can benefit the current debate on the education of the intellectual character.

To support this claim, I shall first show how we can derive the basics of an exemplar-based educational approach that aims at fostering both moral and intellectual virtues. The main assumption grounding the possibility of applying the model to intellectual virtue is that "we find certain persons and certain epistemic behaviors admirable and we learn to think carefully and critically, to be open--minded, intellectually fair, and persevering by imitating persons who have those traits" (Zagzebski 2012, Epistemic Authority, §4).

This account of education works quite well within the domain of character education, or within an eudaimonistic perspective, where educating amounts to providing the young with the resources to flourish as a human being. However, many would contend that there is no room for educating through epistemic exemplars outside such an eudaimonistic perspective, for example within Harvey

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 11

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University
of Oklahoma
The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

Siegel's critical thinking approach to education. The second part of the paper shall be devoted to resisting that claim. In particular, I shall analyze a recent debate between Siegel and Jason Baehr on critical thinking and the epistemic aims of education, to show that fostering intellectual virtues in the young through epistemic exemplars might constitute an important educational tool even for those who endorse a critical thinking approach.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **12**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

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EMBODIED VIRTUES: WHAT HEBREW ḤOKHMAH (WISDOM) CAN TEACH US ABOUT MORAL EDUCATION

The ancient source of Hebrew ḥokhmah (wisdom) is exceptionally rich in many ways. Especially with regard to forming a morally praiseworthy character, however, its deep insights are yet to be (re)discovered and made fruitful for a Western educational context. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to introduce basic didactic tenets of ḥokhmah and apply them to the central questions raised by this year's conference Virtue & Moral Education.

The article will be developed in two steps. In the words of the great Jewish scholar, Abraham Heschel, "[t]he philosophy of educating man is determined by the philosophy of the nature of man." Accordingly, I will start by sketching the Hebrew view of man as an embodied soul and argue that the existence of the soul is an anthropological necessity for our central notions of (libertarian) freedom and, consequently, moral responsibility. In a second step, I will refine the points made in the first part with respect to the moral formation of the soul. This will be achieved by contrasting the ancient educational principles of Hebrew ḥokhmah and Greek paideia, broadly conceived, in relation to the specific questions posed by the conference. By doing so, explicit aspects as to why the former should be preferred over the latter will emerge. Furthermore, those aspects will be applied in an introductory way to our present-day context. I will close by recommending the educational model of ḥokhmah as one possessing both unique anthropological insight and morally transformative power.

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 13

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University
of Oklahoma
The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

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EDUCATING TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR MORAL CHARACTER BUILDING

Aristotle defines human beings as social animals, whose essence entails that they always live in relation with one another (Politics, 1253a). However, this does not always happen smoothly. Conflicts generally characterize many aspects of our everyday life and our relationships are not different. In fact, many of the conflictual situation we face, involve our relationships with others as they are affected by an originating event. In this essay, interpersonal conflict is intended as a situation where the parties involved do not live in a shared moral domain. This means that conflicting parties do not care about common good, the related virtues or understanding other's reasons. Accordingly, the resolution of a conflict implies the ability to return to a moral domain where these elements characterize the web of relationships. This essay tries to highlight possible answers to two of the major questions related to conflict resolution: a. how do we educate to conflict management intended as the restoration of the moral domain?; b. Is the ability to deal with conflict to be considered as a fundamental part of our moral character? In answering these questions, I will try to show how the engagement in conflict management processes can be implemented by the role of remarkable moral agents (Exemplars) and exceptional moral deeds (Supererogatory Acts). Specifically, I will argue that notable agents and deeds will

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | **14**

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University
of Oklahoma
The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

lead the way towards the reestablishment of the moral domain that the conflicting parties have undermined following the event (or series of events) that gave origin to the conflict. In these terms, the moral educational challenge is that of providing innovative formative experiences that will enhance the conflict management skills on a societal level by considering them a constitutive part of our moral character and by taking advantage of instances of moral exceptionality.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **15**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

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MORAL EDUCATION: LESSONS FROM STUDIES OF LEARNING TRANSFER?

This paper presents a small, qualitative study of ethics instruction in the context of continuing education in ethics for professional caregivers at an assisted living facility. The research has been carried out as part of research program on transfer of learning. What motivates the paper is the idea the recent history in studies of transfer, beginning with Jean Lave's situated cognition-based challenge to claims that learning transfers, can be a resource for meeting challenges to the effectiveness and relevance of moral instruction.

Section one introduces the case of a unit having received instruction in, and dilemma-based workshops concerning, moral theories, carried out by a boutique consultancy. The second section offers an analysis of the empirical data as they pertain to the question of transfer. Based on interviews of the care-givers, there is little apparent transfer of learning in terms of explicit mention or apparent use of the theories in relation to their practice. Moreover, the caregivers perform poorly on toy tasks that prompt application of the theories.

The third section briefly introduces Lave's ethnographic studies of math-in-practice with a view to comparing it with the present study. Lave took aim at claims that learning transfers, and criticized the lab-based research methodology that many learning transfer studies have traditionally relied on. While noting differences

The University of Gdańsk

The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **16**

Virtue & Moral Education

Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma

The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

between the field of learning and moral education, the fourth section investigates how responses to Lave's influential challenge can contribute to debates about moral education, including the present study, on two counts: Firstly, a discussion of what role the learner's perspective plays in describing learning, of immediate relevance to Julia Annas' articulacy requirement; the paper points to ways that the learner can display competence without making this competence explicit in ways expected; secondly, based on the empirical study, the paper points to and discusses the relevance of two methods of instruction that have been shown to promote transfer: focusing phenomena, used when introducing general rules during instruction, and expansive framing.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **17**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

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DISCIPLINE, HABIT FORMATION, AND SENSUOUS DISPOSITIONS IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

According to one popular reading, Kant's moral theory and his philosophy of moral education stand in opposition to Aristotelian virtue ethics, insofar as Kant focuses on duty and right action while Aristotle focuses on habituation and character development. Kant's own remarks sometimes lend themselves to such an interpretation, as when he stresses the insufficiency of habits to produce moral actions, stating that "virtue is not to be defined and valued merely as […] a long-standing habit [*Gewohnheit*] of morally good actions acquired by practice" (MS 06:383). Yet, as I will argue, closer attention to Kant's philosophy of education and his moral anthropology shows that this contrast conceals more than it reveals. In fact, Kant has a sophisticated account of moral education [*moralische Bildung*] in which the discipline of our sensuous nature through a process of habituation at an early age provides a necessary condition for all further moral development. Though Kant defines this as a 'merely negative' stage (Päd 09:442), he also speaks of it as the most fundamental. So, for example, Kant says that "omission of discipline is a greater evil than omission of culture for the latter can be made up for later in life, but […] negligence in discipline can never be made good" (Päd 09:444). Kant views this early habituation of our sensuous

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **18**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

nature [*Sinnesart*] as laying the groundwork for the later cognitive development of a mode of thinking [*Denkungsart*] capable of apprehending rational principles and applying them in the formation of maxims and the performance of virtuous actions. Not only does this bring Kant's account of moral education into close proximity with that of Aristotle, it provides a model that in several key respects remains relevant today.

**The University
of Gdańsk**
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | **19**

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

**The University
of Oklahoma**
The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

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SHAPING CHARACTER WHILE SEARCHING FOR THE AIM OF LIFE (MACINTYRE'S UNDERSTANDING OF VIRTUE)

The presentation intends to show the process of searching for the highest good, the main aim of life as a crucial aspect of self – constitution, shaping one's character. The main context for this issue will be the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre and his understanding of the way of how to shape the character. The first part of the presentation focuses on the role of such process (of searching). A man who searches for the main aim of life makes a hierarchy (between other aims and goods), and in this way he cognizes himself. Becoming self – conscious, self – understanding includes exceeding the obligations connected with social roles. Looking for something which exceeds the roles (looking for good to identify with) makes the self – recognition possible and independent from a particular (however important) social context. In contrast to obligations arising from virtues, obligations arising from a particular role do not constitute a unity between different roles. Searching for the good by making one's self – understanding possible enables also morality. According to MacIntyre morality is equal to self – control. However, controlling one's desires, motives is impossible without accepting some rules of practical rationality. Such acceptance requires self – understanding. Searching for the good is a condition not only of self – understanding, but also of the unity of one's life and morality. The second part of the pre-

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | 20

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

sentation intends to show how the process of searching should look. What methods we have. The second part focuses on the role of practical rationality, authorities and community (which always inherits a defined moral tradition). Self-recognition (me as a rational creature) and participation in social discussions make searching for the main aim of life possible. Only such searching shapes the character of a man.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **21**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

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EDUCATING VIRTUOUS EMOTIONS: ARISTOTLE AND THE ALTERNATIVES

This presentation rehearses Aristotle's somewhat unsystematic remarks about emotion education. Moreover, the presentation subjects to critical scrutiny six different discourses on emotion education in addition to Aristotle's: Care ethics; Social and emotional learning; Positive psychology; Emotion-regulation discourse; Academic-emotions discourse; and Social intuitionism. Four differential criteria are used to analyse the content of the discourses: valence of emotions to be educated; value ontology; general aims of emotion education; and self-related goals. Possible criticisms of all the discourses are presented. Subsequently, seven strategies of emotion education (behavioural strategies; ethos modification and emotion contagion; cognitive reframing; service learning/habituation; direct teaching; role modelling; and the arts) are introduced to explore how the seven discourses avail themselves of each strategy. It is argued that there is considerably more convergence in the practical strategies than there is in the theoretical underpinnings of the seven discourses. The advantages of the Aristotelian position are elicited and their practical implications elaborated upon.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **22**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

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TO DEBATE – TO SAY SOMETHING
ABOUT THE WORLD

Splitting up of educational practice into a value-free cognitive component and a cognition-free emotive component, which dominated in modern account of education, has led to serious misunderstanding of the human nature. McDowell challenged this idea, as he demonstrated that when the child is exposed to the adults in the education process, she enters the space of traditions of thought, judgement and discipline (Standish 2016: 98-100). However, Paul Standish argues that a normatively rich conception of education should refer not only to the formal structure of the educational process, but also to the content of this process. The author claims that when the child enters the educational community, not only she develops the general concepts (their representations and the awareness that something is represented), but she also discovers that the reality is something worth speaking about. More importantly, she finds herself as having something to say about the world (Standish 2016: 110-114). This appeal to moral autonomy is a crucial aspect of moral education; the educational community enables the individual to develop her identity by the process of communication.

My purpose is to demonstrate the possible applications of this account to the educational practice. I particularly focus on the art of debate as an adequate method of teaching. I consider the Oxford Debate as an example of problem based learning, which enables its

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 23

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University
of Oklahoma
The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

participants to discuss their opinions, confront their justifications, and finally, to consider themselves as having something to say to other people (school community). The possibility to speak makes young people believe that they are able to self-develop. It also results in a strong moral belief that they are able to transform the reality, which is the subject of their communicational acts (both in their formal and substantial aspect).

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 24

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University
of Oklahoma
The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

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THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF VIRTUES CHALLENGE MORAL DEVELOPMENT?

According to the neural-network model of cognition (P.M. Churchland 2001), the development of moral virtues can modify our brain activity. Such sensitivity of our synaptic connections to behavioral changes has been interpreted differently: Flanagan (1991, 1996) elaborates a deterministic view of the mind and the will, which leaves no room for moral progress, all changes being driven by social and biological environment, whereas MacIntyre (1981) believes that – after the Enlightenment – humankind had a sort of moral regress, due to the loss of the traditional doctrine about virtues, therefore moral theories and practices have to regain that perspective, which is stuck in the past. Others take into account some recent neuroscientific research on morality and education (from Libet 1999 onwards), while trying to overcome them through a creative and flexible interpretation of the role of virtues in human moral behavior (Johnson 2007). In this perspective, the subject's virtuous choices – following the acquired firm dispositions to recognize and do what is good – may reasonably be visualized in the brain by imaging technologies even before the actual choice, precisely as intentional acts (Navarini 2012) with no need of denying human free will as Libet does. On the contrary, virtue learning and training seem particularly successful in showing the connection and mutual influence between our emotional and our cognitive levels, the understanding of freedom as our own consent to action

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **25**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

hypotheses that are given in our experience (Navarini 2014), and the fundamental value of everyone's unique path to personal flourishing. As a consequence, it can be said that scientific findings about neural correlates of moral virtues do not necessarily imply an "exact science of virtues" which would match a specific virtue with a specific place and function in the brain. It may rather mean that the so called pre-moral neurological level (Boella 2008) could be interpreted as a mirror of the spontaneous tendency to good action which tipycally follows the acquisition of moral virtues. If this is true, we are encouraged to use this knowledge to promote a more balanced structure of cognition and behavior through virtues because of their impact on the brain and on moral decision making. In conclusion, the very empirical research that challenged virtue ethics, provides us with new evidence of the central role of virtues in moral education and thinking (Younis 2015).

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 26

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University
of Oklahoma
The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

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A 4E MODEL OF VIRTUE-ACQUISITION

This paper will provide a possible approach of how the virtues are acquired, using theories of 4E cognition. Aristotle (2009), Annas (1995; 2003) and Zagzebski (1996) will be drawn upon to argue that virtues are skills that must be practised. I conceptualise these skills using 4E cognition, which entails that the mind is embodied, embedded, extended and enactive (e.g. Colombetti 2015; Kiverstein and Wheeler 2012). The 4E agent perceives possibilities for action, called affordances. When the agent perceives a virtuous possibility for action, then, she perceives a virtue affordance. This affordance perception occurs through affective changes in the agent (Colombetti 2013; Kiverstein and Miller 2015; Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014). In other words, emotion guides attention to the affordances that are relevant for the agent. Within (many) 4E cognition accounts, it is posited that exercising a skill becomes more automated as the agent becomes more familiar with the skill (e.g. Chemero 2009; Rietveld 2010). The skill-acquisition theory of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) with be utilised to describe this process, applying it to the virtues. Their 5-stage account of skill-acquisition models the agent who, by practice, becomes less reliant on rule-following as her grasp on the skill increases. They distinguish among the novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficient, and expert skilful actor. As such, skill possession is a matter of degree rather than a yes/no dichotomy. I argue that the same holds for virtues; one can be more or less proficient in courage, for

The University
of Gdańsk

The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 27

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University
of Oklahoma

The Institute
for the Study
of Human
Flourishing

example. The proficient and expert agent rely on trained affective responses to the situation, so that they can directly respond to the situation without the need for deliberation. Experiencing the right emotions is therefore especially important for these agents. For this reason I will conclude that learning the virtues requires emotion regulation training, in addition to practical experience.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **28**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

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MAX SCHELER ON EXEMPLARS

Some contemporary virtue ethicists have developed an interest in the concept of moral exemplar as a source of both moral cognition and development. Interestingly enough, the idea that ethics should consider the significance of exemplars in our moral life is also a conclusion and culmination of Max Scheler`s ethical personalism as presented in the final part of *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values* (Scheler 1973) as well as in his essay *Exemplars of Person and Leaders* (Scheler 1987), although the theoretical framework of his claims is rather different. Scheler`s conviction that exemplars play a crucial role in morals is rooted in some of his more basic and peculiar theses, mainly that: (1) value-ception takes place due to acts of prerational nature, acts that are both emotional and intentional, i.e. love and hate in the first place, (2) it is possible to conduct ethics *a priori* and to discover this way an objective hierarchy of values together with its internal laws, (3) persons (not necessarily human persons) are the pinnacle of being and – somehow in like manner - higher values are values of persons. My presentation is aimed at showing an outcome of Scheler`s analyses of the exemplar phenomenon as developed on the base of the aforementioned context.

The University of Gdańsk
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PAGE | **29**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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ADMIRING MORAL EXEMPLARS

I propose a relatively neglected sub-discipline in ethics that we call exemplarism, offer a schematic representation of the exemplarity relation, and briefly discuss the nature of the elements of that relation. Notable results emerging from the present discussion are these: In the exemplarity relationship, the excellence that is admired can be not only the virtues, but the basic humanity of the exemplar; thus not only canonical exemplars like Father Gregory Boyle and Jean Vanier, but also "ordinary" people, can be admired as exemplars. This possibility is especially salient and important where cultural externals obscure the humanity of the potential exemplar. Admiration is the central emotion involved in the exemplarity relation, but not all admiration is virtuous; in particular, some admiration mediates the dehumanizing relationship that belongs to the social ethos that Vanier calls "the Normal". Virtuous admiration presupposes as well as fosters virtues in the admirer; this fact implies that admiration cannot be the unique foundation, either of moral development, or of moral concepts, and calls into question the idea of exemplarism as a general moral theory.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **30**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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MORAL EDUCATION & MORAL COMPETENCE

Historically, the concept of moral education appeared in ancient Greece as an integral element of *paideia*, while the term „moral competence" was formulated only in XX century. However, in fact these two concepts have a lot in common. In my presentation I discuss some possible connections between them.

I distinguish three meanings of the term „competence": 1) an ability to perform; 2) a specific kind of applied knowledge; 3) an authority of a legal body to deal with and make pronouncements in legal matters. Analogically, the concept of moral competence refers to 1) a disposition/tendency/ability to reason and judge; to reflect own acting; to do good/just; 2) the practical wisdom that enables the person to do good/just that, in any given situation; 3) an authority to make moral decisions. It is not difficult to notice that these concepts of moral competence are very close to the notions of moral sense, virtue, and conscience.

In the first sense, moral competence seems to be a basis/foundation/origin of moral education – necessary but not sufficient condition for moral development. But it is not clear, what is the essence of moral competence (rational/emotional/intuitive?). Is moral competence something characteristic for all humans? (do amoralists exist?) Moreover, suppose that moral competence is – like Noam Chomsky's linguistic competence – an ability, which involved understanding and producing sentences never previously encountered. Is this possible to take morally good action in unexpected challenging situations?

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **31**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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In the second meaning, moral competence is an aim/expected result of moral education. In the third sense, moral competence can be either an authority of individuals to make moral decisions independently or the more formal (for example professional) authority to make moral decisions which directly concern other people and their lives. The role of an authority (parent/teacher/meaningful person) in the process of moral education is undisputed. On the other hand, the obedience to the authority may be highly problematic, as well as the shaping of moral decisions by automatic human tendencies and social influence. In which moment of life/in which situation the control over their own moral life should be taken by individuals?

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 32

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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VIRTUE ETHICS, MORAL EDUCATION, AND THE CHALLENGE OF RADICAL MORAL SUBJECTIVISM

As a high school philosophy teacher I have noticed that students increasingly agree with what I will call "radical moral subjectivism": the idea that morality is based on personal preferences and beliefs. In this paper I will defend two claims. First: *moral education should debunk radical moral subjectivism*. This type of moral subjectivism is not only false but also "disastrous for society" (Talbot 1999). On radical moral subjectivism, moral discussions would be irrational and moral progress would be impossible. If moral education is to have a serious place in school systems then it should at least succeed in refuting radical moral subjectivism. Second: *Theories based on virtue ethics without an objective ontological foundation are ill equipped to handle the challenge of radical moral subjectivism*. There are many different kinds of contemporary virtue ethics. Some of these theories appear to be based on a universal notion of human nature (Kristjánsson 2013). However, a theory being universal does not equate it being objective in the ontological sense. I will examine four different ontological foundations of virtue ethics: the Aristotelian teleological view, the Christian virtue ethics view, the social-constructionist view and the human flourishing view. I will argue that these different ontological foundations have different consequences pertaining to the challenge of radical moral subjectivism. The more objective

The University of Gdańsk
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PAGE | **33**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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the foundation is, the more chance virtue ethics has to overcome the challenge of radical moral subjectivism and to provide a basis for a sound theory of moral education.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **34**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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THE AGENCY OF CHILDREN IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY. INTERCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL EDUCATION

The aim of the paper is to analyse the issue of shaping and maintaining ontological security on the basis of Anthony Giddens' theory, developed by Hanna Mamzer with reference to intercultural ground. I present psychological and environmental factors for maintaining individual ontological security and analyse the phenomena of trust and routine as its main elements. They are identified as the ones that evoke creativity, understood as readiness for shaping the value hierarchy without discarding values that one considers as central for his actions. Creativity as flexibility does not assume extreme identity changes but allows to develop mental as well as behavioural patterns that help fit in the context. The paper also discusses agency as a phenomenon that can be classified as a part of the a moral competence that, according to Georg Lind, is understood as "the ability to resolve problems and conflicts on the basis of one's moral principles through deliberation and discussion, instead of through violence, deceit, or bowing down to others." The paper examines the interdependence of ontological security, agency and moral competence, with reference to contemporary issue of identity as a process within intercultural environment. This is the experience unavoidable for children as they often participate in an accidental and unforeseen reality. Hence, they

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **35**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
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learn to be prepared for spontaneous reactions that do not fit their behavioural schemes. Agency is therefore based on a capacity of "becoming" or "gaining personality" rather than "being allowed to…" and presents a child as a reflexive social actor.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **36**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND THE EROSION OF MORAL THINKING

In my paper I would like to address the problem of training in professional ethics, using the example of medical ethics. My main claim is that the contemporary professional ethics, dominated by rationalistic approach to morality based on principles and codes of conduct, and influenced to a certain degree by utilitarian ethics, is misleading. Training and promoting this kind of approach to professional ethics, brings about the erosion of moral thinking which is being replaced by strategic analysis, argumentative competence and technical expertise. Strictly utilitarian approach to professional ethics does not only erode moral thinking but also proves to be counter-effective what I will illustrate invoking the "crowding out effect" ("corruption effect") which may be interpreted as the competition between incentives which results in the substitution of intrinsic (moral) motivation in an agent by extrinsic (utility-based). Rationalistic approach to morality rests on an assumption of the atomization of morality, i.e., possibility of isolating deeds, motives, and reasons from the entire human life and from who people are and want to be. This seems to be inconsistent with our everyday experience in which our actions and decisions are deeply rooted in the dynamic complexity of our life. I will argue that moral education should be rather aimed at defining the moral horizon (aims and meaning of social practices, roles and professions) and helping us in becoming oneself. Moral reflection should be aimed at unifying

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 37

Virtue & Moral
Education
GDAŃSK, 17–18 MAY 2018

The University
of Oklahoma
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of Human
Flourishing

our experience with our system of values which requires abandoning of the purely rationalistic approach to ethics and replacing utilitarian and deontological ethics by a broader moral thinking.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **38**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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KONSTANZ METHOD OF DILEMMA DISCUSSION (KMDD®) AS A NEW CHANCE FOR MORAL EDUCATION

My proposed presentation aims to show that within the classroom practice at school we can provide wide range of experiences crucial for moral-democratic competence development. One of the most important methods of fostering moral competence and democratic attitude is KMDD® - *Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion* introduced by prof. Georg Lind for Konstanz University, Germany. Based partly on classical L. Kohlberg's dilemma discussion practice and partly on some new ideals, KMDD® brings an opportunity to provide young people such a classroom experience that will help them learn how to become a conscious members of democratic society and practice social vulnerability in a safe environment at the same time. As far as this type of environment is open for peaceful discussion without any force it may help provide upbringing processes based on moral and democratic competencies. It seems that method is important, but diversified social practice is simply a must. KMDD® brings those two aspects together. As a first certified KMDD® Teacher in Poland I would like to describe KMDD® and its use in educational practice during my presentation. Thanks to KMDD® current classroom experience may finally become really significant for the change of social perspective and moral-democratic competence. It can be partly confirmed by the results of accompanying research. The effectiveness of KMDD® can

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **39**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

be measured by MCT® (*Moral Competence Test*) which gives the opportunity to estimate to what extent KMDD® can be used as a well-designed tool of fostering moral competence development within education practice.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **40**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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EDUCATING FOR VIRTUE
WITH MORAL SKILL TRAINING

A recent trend in both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology is to conceptualize virtue as a skill, and in this paper I discuss an approach to educating for virtue, based on what moral skill training might look like, given what we know about skill acquisition and self-regulation. Skills are acquired through deliberate practice, where you attempt to improve by correcting past mistakes and overcoming your current limitations. So in acquiring moral virtues as skills, we have reasons to focus on some of the common moral mistakes we make along with other frequent obstacles to acting well. Here this project addresses the situationist critique on virtue, as social psychology experiments highlight some of our current weaknesses when it comes to acting morally, as whether people act morally well or poorly is often strongly influenced by irrelevant factors of a situation, such as with framing effects, stereotypes, and the bystander effect.

Fortunately, there are ways to mitigate the effects of these situational influences that can be found in the psychological literature on skill acquisition and self-regulatory strategies. Instead of viewing situational influences as barriers to moral development and acquiring virtue, a skill model of virtue can view the recognition of these influences as opportunities for further developing virtue. That is, improvements in skill come about through awareness of our errors and limitations, along with deliberate practice and

PAGE | 41

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

The University
of Oklahoma
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Flourishing

strategies targeted at correcting those errors and expanding our abilities. Without that process, one remains at a fixed level of skill development. So the situationist literature is helpful in bringing out shortcomings we were not fully aware we had, so that we can begin the process of strategizing how to overcome those shortcomings, and increase our level of moral skillfulness. This account of the acquisition of virtue should thus lead to improvements in moral education.

The University
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The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 42

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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LET ME TRULY SEE THE GOOD.
ON THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN MORAL EDUCATION

The model of moral education dominant today (at least at schools and universities) is focused on students skills of abstract theorizing and forming arguments. It seems to neglect the role of moral experience and acquaintance with the subject matter of moral life. The most probable result of such education is the ability to juggle with moral concepts, win philosophical or political debates, but not necessarily what we would call true moral knowledge, not to mention of acquiring any level of moral virtue.

Proper moral education should offer students opportunity to have formative moral experiences, (more intimate) acquaintance with moral values, thus giving a chance to form genuine moral knowledge, and acquire a more efficient motivation to a morally good life. And to achieve this goal moral education requires focusing more on creating situations via literature, film, but also encouraging students to participating in morally relevant practices such as for example service in hospices, skauting etc..

I am going to argue that such a model of education is more efficient than the dominant model because it gives more opportunities for a genuine moral perception or experience. The crucial element of such experience are moral emotions, which I characterize as "perceptual qualia" of moral properties. It is through moral emotions that we are acquainted with moral properties and are able to form our own moral concepts. My argument, thus, will consist

**The University
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Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | **43**

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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Flourishing

of both: giving positive reasons why think moral emotions are, although to a limited extend and with a need of some corrections, reliable means in discovering moral, as well as responding to at least some most serious objections.

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PAGE | **44**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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EXEMPLARISM − MORAL THEORY OR METHOD OF MORAL EDUCATION?

Linda Trinkaus – Zagzebski in her last publications opened another very important ethical debate. She formulated exemplarist moral theory (2017) founded on admiration towards moral exemplars. However, Zagzebski does not start with laying out her conceptual basis, as it was done by many ethicists before her, defining basic ethical concepts of moral good, evil, virtue and vice, good or evil motives, good or evil life, etc. She knows that such a procedure leads to never-ending debates which prevent one from making further steps, towards answering practical ethical questions. Is ethics, first of all, not a practical matter? Is its goal not to indicate how to live, what to do, which path of morally worthy development to take?

In my presentation, I will analyze a few strong and weak sides of exemplarism as a moral theory. Its obvious strength is that it gives a satisfactory solution to the problem of motivation. The emotion of admiration has the power to motivate one to follow the admired exemplar. I will take a closer look at the issue of what kind of exemplars are more effective in evoking the desire to imitate: moral heroes, saints, and sages, as Linda Zagzebski would put it, or people who are more like us, within our reach, who among things which all normal people do, do also something we find morally relevant and worth of our admiration.

I will also discuss the issue of the starting point of exemplarism. Linda Trinkaus – Zagzebski takes admiration of exemplars to be

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PAGE | **45**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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epistemologically prior, on the basis of which all other ethical concepts (such as good, evil, virtue, vice, etc.) could be defined. I am going to argue that such an approach is flawed with what could be described as a kind of "circularity" or "vicious circle". To recognize one as an exemplar we already need to be able to recognize such concepts as morally good, evil, virtuous etc. If so, how these concepts can be based on what presupposes them. Thus, exemplarism, as it is understood by Linda Trinkaus – Zagzebski, may only be treated as a useful, auxiliary method of moral education, but not as an autonomous ethical theory.

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PAGE | **46**

Virtue & Moral Education
GᴅᴀŃꜱᴋ, 17–18 Mᴀʏ 2018

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CONFUCIAN MORAL EDUCATION – ON BECOMING A HUMANE HUMAN BEING

When trying to answer multifaceted questions concerning moral education, it is almost impossible not to turn to Confucius and Confucianism. As Aristotle was known as "the Philosopher," Confucius was credited as "the Teacher." His philosophical project was largely based on a comprehensive vision of a life-long moral education that encompasses every sphere of life.

In Confucius's own words: "When I was fifteen I set my heart on learning. At thirty I took my stand. At forty I was without confusion. At fifty I knew the command of Tian [Heaven]. At sixty I heard it with a compliant ear. At seventy I follow the desires of my heart and do not overstep the bounds." One of the most important books constituting the Confucian Classics is, with a good reason, called the Great Learning (大学 Daxue). It starts with a phrase: "What the Great Learning teaches, is to illustrate illustrious virtue; to renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence."

The goal of Confucian moral education is to set a person on a course of becoming a junzi 君子 – which means a consummate, ideally ethical and capable person, who practically embodies a set of virtues, with 仁 ren (benevolence/consummate conduct, humanness) as its pinnacle. It is an unceasing effort of becoming a benevolent, consummate person.

A careful reading of Confucian writings such as the Analects, the Great Learning or the Classic of Family Reverence can gre-

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Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 47

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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of Human
Flourishing

atly contribute to understanding issues such as how and by what means should a moral character be shaped and how to create an environment conducive to constant moral development.

The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **48**

Virtue & Moral Education
GDAŃSK, 17–18 MAY 2018

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MORAL EDUCATION
AND ADMIRABLE MORAL EXEMPLARS

Linda Zagzebski (2017) gives four types of exemplars; a Christian saint, a hero, a genius, and a sage or wise person. She claims that these people are exemplars because they are admirable. According to her theory, a person's admirability is a signal that helps others discern that he/she is an exemplar that expresses some excellence that they should learn to become good. Although she admits geniuses are admirable, she excludes them from the exemplars because inborn talents or excellence, by definition, cannot be acquired by imitating those admirable people. In other words, they cannot be *exemplars* to be learned. Here, we see a case in her theory that someone can be admirable but not morally exemplar.

I do not disagree with this point. Rather, my question is this: is there a case in which someone is not admirable (≠blamable) but still a moral exemplar from whom we can learn? Her theory seems not to allow such a nonadmirable moral exemplar because it regards admiration as a key psychological driver for people to imitate them and to become morally good. In contrast, I would like to consider the existence of a nonadmirable moral exemplar. Once we find such an exemplar, the admiration will not be a necessary condition for being a moral exemplar or for moral education. To figure out such a nonadmirable moral exemplar, I focus on two cases. First, as a relatively moderate case, I focus on a medical and

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PAGE | **49**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

psychological research on performance management in space, for this research give a clue for understanding moral development without exemplars (Tachibana et al. 2017; Tachibana 2018). Second, as a more radical case, I focus on a neuroscientific research concerning neurofeedback techniques, for this technique seems to work for moral education (Tachibana 2017a; Tachibana 2017b). I conclude that the assumption of admirability as a necessary condition for being a moral exemplar or for moral education is cancelled. This conclusion will suggest the possibility of moral education without require admirable moral exemplars.

The University
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The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 50

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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EDUCATING GLOBAL CITIZENS OF THE FUTURE: VIRTUE AND MORAL EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

In the digital age, two features in particular stand out. The first is that our children's generation will have access to more means than ever before, in the form of supercomputers and algorithms. Educating children with the ability to evaluate, shape, and pursue their own ends are therefore paramount. The second lies in the pace of change of social values spurred on by technology. The urgency for children to be able to adapt to while maintaining their own values, an all-important aspect in autonomy that contributes to their flourishing, needs to be addressed.

The revival of Aristotelian thought in education and virtue ethics is much welcomed, as virtues can lead us to a better understanding of ourselves and the world, in this quest. In my role as practitioner in international education, I have found that children find discussions of virtue ethics more accessible, in comparison to deontology's duty-based concepts (which can be alienating to a different culture in giving duty content) and to the cost-benefit analysis structure of consequentialism.

Epistemologically, through discussions of virtue ethics, children from diverse backgrounds can go beyond their local relative viewpoint, moving from knowing 'the what' to understanding 'the why'. In thinking about a broader framework of ethics, children acquire a willingness and curiosity, which forms part their character as

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PAGE | **51**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
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morally thinking agents. This is the development account, a dynamic strength that is supported by virtue ethics. Lastly, virtue ethics brings back focus on the role of emotions. This last consideration not only finds sustenance based on recent scholarship demonstrating its rich cognitive/ intentional content, but is also timely in the face of increased automated substitution of human activities. In short, virtue ethics provides a more holistic moral education experience that meets the challenges of educating and adequately preparing children for the future.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **52**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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THE DARK SIDE OF THE EXCEPTIONAL.
ON MORAL EXEMPLARS, CHARACTER EDUCATION,
AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS

Largely due to Linda T. Zagzebski's seminal works on Exemplarist Moral Theory, recent literature has seen a retrieval of interest in analyzing the role morally exceptional individuals play in our everyday moral lives, as well as the way they ground our moral judgements on virtues, values, and right actions. Such new wave has also contributed to favor a retrieval of philosophical studies on positive moral emotions targeting moral exemplarity, and particularly admiration. From a character educational perspective, research on such emotions is proving particularly fruitful, in that it concerns the question of how they can be canalized so as to foster virtue acquisition.

The purpose of this paper is that of walking a different path, and focusing on the negative exemplarity-related emotions (NERE), and on their educational implications. If it is true that exemplars can inspire gratitude, moral awe, and admiration or elevation, it is also undeniable that confronting with one's moral exceptionality may in some cases elicit negative emotions, such as envy, guilt, and shame. How, then, should educators deal with these reactions? Against Zagzebski, who takes NERE as mere obstacles to one's

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **53**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University of Oklahoma
The Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing

moral growth, we claim they can be considered as viable paths to virtue acquisition, which should be included in an educational process, rather than eradicated. In this paper, therefore, we elaborate a proposal to integrate NERE in a character-educational strategy, by maintaining their *intrinsic*, rather than merely *instrumental*, value.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | **54**

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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MORAL CHARACTER AND EMBODIED SITUATIONISM

Drawing on empirical material from social psychology, 'situationism' argues that the susceptibility of moral behavior to situational influences undermines certain conceptions of character. Some have argued that far from undermining virtue ethics, the situationist challenge has contributed strengthening its theoretical commitments. In this talk, I put forward a more limited thesis, 'embodied situationism' (ES), which engages recent empirical findings and unearths mechanisms responsible for particular situational effects. I will argue that the empirical

material supports the claims of ES and that ES is immune to some important objections against situationism. However, if ES correctly depicts the relevant processes, then it both raises some challenges to the idea of developing moral character and also points toward productive debate about methods in moral education.

The University
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The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 55

Virtue & Moral
Education

Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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VIRTUE AND THE DIVISION
OF MORAL LINGUISTIC LABOR

In this paper I defend a principle I call the Division of Moral Linguistic Labor, modeled on Hilary Putnam's principle of the Division of Linguistic Labor, and discuss the way the principle applies to „virtue" and the names of virtues. The semantics of moral terms I propose in Exemplarist Moral Theory is externalist in two ways. First, the meaning of fundamental moral terms is determined in part by the way the world is, in particular, features of exemplars. Second, the meaning of moral terms is determined in part by a social network linking the users of the terms to the extension of the terms. The principle of the division of moral linguistic labor calls attention to the second way in which moral terms are externalist in my view. I think that this way of looking at the semantics of moral terms explains some challenges in the use of virtue theory for the practical purposes of moral education and civic discourse, but it also means that educators have a special role in affecting moral discourse that underpins the learning of virtue.

The University
of Gdańsk
The Institute
of Philosophy,
Sociology
and Journalism

PAGE | 56

Virtue & Moral
Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

The University
of Oklahoma
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for the Study
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MORAL VIRTUES AND MEDICAL EDUCATION. THE CONCEPT OF EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO

Medicine is a scientific discipline which combines both theory and practice. It is required of physicians to possess medical knowledge, appropriate experience, as well as specific moral attitudes. The list of expected attitudes and physician's behavior is included in ethical codes, described by various conventions, and for not complying with them physicians are threatened of professional and legal sanctions. To what moral attitudes should we teach medical students so that after completing their education they can be able to fully perform their tasks well? The answer to this question can be found by analyzing the concept of medical ethics proposed by Edmund D. Pellegrino. The clinician and philosopher pays special attention to the issue of moral virtues in medical ethics and describes, in his opinion, the most important virtues for doctors.

The aim of the speech is to present the catalog of moral virtues of a doctor, as elaborated by E. D. Pellegrino, together with the indication of basic philosophical assumptions of that concept.

The University of Gdańsk
The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism

PAGE | 57

Virtue & Moral Education
Gdańsk, 17–18 May 2018

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